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Abstract
In this essay, it is contended that by welcoming a cosmopolitan discipline of law that encompasses 
‘all levels of social relations and legal orderings’ (both dominant and peripheral) as well as by 
suggesting that the intellectual heritage of Western jurisprudence be adapted ‘to the new predica-
ment of global law’, William Twining offers a platform to the world’s marginalised legal systems 
and formations to assert their relevance in the advancement of legal theory. In developing this 
argument, I will first examine what opportunities exist within Twining’s theorising to reclaim and 
de-marginalise non-Western understandings of the law and its social value within the context of 
pluralism and globalisation. Secondly, I discuss what could be the lessons and implications of his 
proposals for a globalised legal theory on legal education and scholarship in the less dominant or 
‘subaltern’ legal systems. I also suggest how scholars from subaltern territories could effectively 
insert their voices in the diversification and pluralisation of global legal theory.
1. INTRODUCTION
Legal scholars from the Global South reading William Twining’s Globalisation and Legal 
Scholarship1 for the first time will find it interesting on many levels. For a start, it builds 
upon his work on the broader subject of what he terms ‘general jurisprudence’.2 Twin-
ing’s general jurisprudence would seem to be a departure from the often atomised and 
insular treatment of the subject in dominant legal thought that is driven mostly by Euro-
American traditions. It also confirms a variety of canons on the relationship between 
* PhD candidate and Legal Process Instructor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Canada. 
The author is grateful to Professor Peer Zumbansen for his encouragement and to the two anonymous 
reviewers at TLT for their comments and suggestions. Email: ugochukwubc@gmail.com. All websites 
accessed April 2013.
1 William Twining, Globalisation and Legal Scholarship (Wolf Legal Publishers, 2011).
2 William Twining, General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global Perspective (Cambridge 
University Press, 2009).
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what could be called subaltern legal formations and liberal—and what is sometimes 
described as parochial3—legal theory. 
I do not use the subaltern concept in the context of a political category. I rather use 
it in a legal geographical sense as bringing within its ambit those discreet, marginalised, 
non-Western legal regimes and systems prevalent in different regions of what is 
commonly known as the ‘Global South’. The ‘subaltern’ I have in mind here is the category 
of legal systems and formations that could parallel the poor and disempowered in a 
political sense such that those legal systems are consigned to the margins and periphery 
of legal/cultural discourse. I mean the legal systems of ‘the Ancient World, the Orient,4 
the Primitive World, the Third World, the Underdeveloped World, the Developing 
World and now the Global South’.5 I also have in mind the legal systems of ‘poorer and 
less technologically advanced societies’ in contrast to their ‘liberal, well-ordered’ or 
‘hierarchical’ counterparts.6 
This essay uses sub-Saharan Africa as an exemplar of the subaltern society that is 
herein suggested. While I illustrate my argument mostly by reference to that region, 
this should not be taken to suggest that there are monolithic subaltern or African legal 
systems. My initial contention is that by welcoming a cosmopolitan discipline of law 
which encompasses ‘all levels of social relations and legal orderings’7 (both dominant 
and peripheral), as well as by suggesting that the intellectual heritage of Western 
jurisprudence be adapted ‘to the new predicament of global law’8, Twining offers a 
platform to these apparently fringe legal systems and formations to assert their relevance 
in a world in which globalisation is fuelling debates about pluralism in normative legal 
orders at the domestic and international fronts.
This intervention supports the proposition that what seems to have normalised as a 
scholarship of reaction animating much of the Global South’s discourse on the uses and 
abuses of liberal jurisprudence and legal theory would not be enough under a globalised 
context to represent Southern, or for that matter other subaltern (peripheral),9 voices in 
this debate. What I intend to do in this contribution is examine the potential opportunities 
that exist within Twining’s theorising, to reclaim and de-marginalise non-Western 
understandings of the law and its social value within the context of globalisation. Second, 
I will briefly discuss what could be the implications of his proposals for globalised legal 
3 Ibid, 10. 
4 See Edward Said, Orientalism (Vintage, 1978).
5 Jean Comaroff and John L Comaroff, ‘Theory from the South: Or, How Euro-America is Evolving toward 
Africa’ (2012) 22 Anthropological Forum 113. 
6 John Rawls, ‘The Law of Peoples’ (1993) 20 Critical Inquiry 44.
7 Twining (n 1) 9.
8 Ibid. 
9 Giovanni Marini, ‘Forward: Legal Traditions: A Critical Appraisal’ (2011) 2 Comparative Law Review 1; see 
also Mark Toufayan, ‘When British Justice (in African Colonies) Points Two Ways: On Dualism, Hybridity, 
and the Genealogy of Juridical Negritude in Taslim Olawale Elias’ (2008) 21 Leiden Journal of International 
Law 377.
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theory on legal education and scholarship in the Global South generally and Africa more 
specifically.
2. THE COMPLEX FIELD OF LEGAL THEORY
Before considering Twining’s specific insights which are central to my intervention, it 
is important to take a look, however cursory, at the general field of jurisprudence and 
legal theory, as this will enable a clearer understanding of the novel ideas he is bringing 
to the field. In doing so, I will look at two different strands of scholarship that tend to 
perceive both complex and dichotomous tendencies in legal theory. Michael Giudice 
identifies ‘diverse cohabitants’ associated with legal theory including moral, political, 
or normative, descriptive-explanatory, and social scientific theorists of various kinds.10 
Notwithstanding their numbers, Giudice collapses these competing paradigms into two 
distinct categories: participant/internal and nonparticipant/external theorists. While the 
former is positivistic and takes on board the ideas of famous thinkers like HLA Hart 
(conceptual analysis) and Hans Kelsen (pure theory), the latter is more empirical and 
accommodates such legal scholars as Richard Posner (social scientific and socioeco-
nomic legal theory).11 While positivism theorises that law can only be understood in 
terms of its own ‘internal dynamic’,12 empirical (or critical, if you like) thinkers assert 
that ‘a complex interplay of causes and effects’13 is essential to the understanding of law.
This would seem to indicate that Jeremy Bentham’s earlier effort to ‘construct a 
jurisprudence that applied around the world’, a project which his disciple John Austin 
also called ‘general [or universal]14 jurisprudence’ or legal science, was a futile one.15 It 
failed apparently for two major reasons. First, it drew heavily on the positivist tradition16 
described above, and second, it was ambiguous in its failure to account for the distinction 
10 Michael Giudice, ‘Ways of Understanding Diversity among Theories of Law’ (2005) 24 Law and Philosophy 
509.
11 Ibid, 510.
12 Pierre Bourdieu, ‘The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field’ (1987) 38 Hastings Law Journal 
814; Harold J Spaeth, ‘The Attitudinal Model’ in Lee Epstein (ed), Contemplating Courts (Congressional 
Quarterly Inc, 1995) 296; Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (Anchor, 1963) 33. 
13 Giudice (n 10) 511; see also Richard Abel, ‘Law and Society: Project and Practice’ (2010) 6 Annual Review of 
Law and Social Science 1; Mariana Valverde, ‘The Sociology of Law as a Means against Struggle itself ’ (2006) 
15 Social and Legal Studies 591; Allan Hutchinson, ‘Judges and Politics: An Essay from Canada” (2004) 24 
Legal Studies 275.
14 See Philip Schofield, ‘Jeremy Bentham and Nineteenth-Century English Jurisprudence’ (1991) 12 Journal 
of History 59.
15 Brian Z Tamanaha, ‘What is “General” Jurisprudence? A Critique of Universalist Claims by Philosophical 
Concepts of Law’ Transnational Legal Theory, forthcoming, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2018283.
16 In fact to Austin ‘General Jurisprudence’ was the same as ‘the Philosophy of Positive Law’. See Roger 
Berkowitz, ‘From Justice to Justification: An Alternative Genealogy of Positive Law’ (2011) 1 University of 
California Irvine Law Review 611. 
552 Transnational Legal Theory
between the ‘general’ and ‘particular’ in Bentham’s thinking about law.17 This in turn, 
according to Tamanaha, gave impetus to two distinct approaches to conceptualising 
general jurisprudence separate from how Bentham and Austin formulated it. These 
approaches are far more relevant to Twining’s project than the sum of all the previous 
complexities I have traced up to this time.
Of these two approaches, one is dominant and holds that ‘the central task of general 
jurisprudence is to produce a universally applicable theory of the nature of law’.18 The 
second approach is not concerned with a single ‘theory of the nature of law … but rather 
on constructing a theoretical framework that addresses various manifestations of law 
around the globe’.19 Significantly, rather than the insular and generally imperialistic 
peculiarity of the first approach, the tack of the second ‘brings within its compass state 
law, international law, transnational law, religious law, human rights law, customary 
law, and other instantiations of law’.20 Tamanaha specifically situates Twining’s idea of 
general jurisprudence within this paradigm.21
Considered against this background, it is clear that no general understanding of what 
the law is has ever been constructed.22 Theorists on the various sides of the debate often 
claimed priority for their methodological preferences and ascribed better grounding to 
their theoretical insights. This led to what has been termed ‘imperialism’ in legal theory. 
But imperialism here is described as the claim of ‘supremacy for a particular approach, 
as the only or most important way to a true or accurate understanding of law’.23 Yet this 
form of ‘imperialism’ only gave expression to a methodological turf war among theorists 
who all belong to a dominant Euro-American or Western tradition in legal theory. In this 
turf war, non-Western understandings of law, however rudimentary or undeveloped,24 
were completely excluded in what obviously is a different kind of imperialism, to which 
I now turn.
17 Tamanaha (n 15) 1.
18 Ibid, 2; see also Joseph Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason 




22 Bryan S Turner and Berna Zengin Arslan, ‘Shari’a and Legal Pluralism in the West’ (2011) 14 European 
Journal of Social Theory 142; Kenneth Ehrenberg, ‘Law is Not (best considered) an Essentially Contested 
Concept’ (2011) 7 International Journal of Law in Context 209.
23 Giudice (n 10) 510.
24 Brett Shadle, ‘Changing Traditions to Meet Current Altering Conditions: Customary Law, African Courts 
and the Rejection of Codification in Kenya, 1930–60’ (1999) 40 Journal of African History 411; Martin 
Chanock, ‘Neither Customary Nor Legal: African Customary Law in an Era of Family Law Reform’ (1989) 
3 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 72; Sally Falk Moore, ‘Treating Law as Knowledge: 
Telling Colonial Officers what to Say to Africans about Running “Their Own” Native Courts’ (1992) 26 Law 
and Society Review 11; Basil Ugochukwu, ‘Unpacking the Universal: African Human Rights Philosophy in 
Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart’ in Oche Onazi (ed), African Legal Theory and Contemporary Problems: 
Critical Essays (Springer, forthcoming); Andrew Harding, ‘Global Doctrine and Local Knowledge: Law in 
South East Asia’ (2002) 51 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 35.
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3. TWINING, THE SUBALTERN AND GLOBALISED LEGAL THEORY
In canvassing his ideas about how the phenomenon of globalisation should inform cur-
rent legal thought, Twining recognises the divide between the dominant Euro-American 
traditions and subaltern/marginalised ones. It is for this very reason that his argument 
should appeal to proponents of subaltern legal traditions. Twining’s contribution is 
clearly poised against the variant of legal imperialism which excludes non-Western con-
ceptions of law from legal theory. He calls for a more global/pluralistic view of law and 
not just its conception as framed by dominant and hegemonistic Western thoughts, ideas 
and institutions. 
In developing and situating his contribution within the pluralism/globalisation 
debate, Twining first notes the diffusion, reception and transplantation of legal traditions 
across jurisdictions, also acknowledging that imperialism and colonialism are factors 
that to a great degree accounted for this diffusion. ‘Law spreads with Empire,’ he states.25 
Consequently, Twining asserts that the law of the modern state is but an exclusive 
creation of European and Anglo-American legal traditions, which has ‘spread through 
nearly all the world via colonialism, imperialism, trade and more recent neo-colonial 
influences’.26 Just as significantly, in most postcolonial subaltern states questions persist 
as to the suitability of the imposed legal traditions in dealing with social issues that are 
context-specific in institutional and cultural terms.
What this makes clear is that imposing a particular legal system (complete with 
the theoretical ideas that undergird it) on a colonised territory is no guarantee that the 
imposed system and theory will achieve anywhere near the same results in the colonised 
territory as in the territory of the imposing power.27 This is an important lesson in the 
spread of dominant legal theory and traditions through colonialism and imperialism. In 
Africa specifically, liberal construction of law that is removed from time, social context 
and historical circumstance has not fulfilled the ambition of social engineering.28 The 
25 Twining (n 1) 27; see also Lauren Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 
1400–1900 (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 127; Achille Mbembe, On the Postcolony (University of 
California Press, 2001) 25; Anthony Anghie, ‘Colonial Origins of International Law’ in Eve Darian-Smith 
and Peter Fitzpatrick (eds), Laws of the Postcolonial (University of Michigan Press, 1999); Helen Marshall 
Carter, ‘Prospects for the Administration of Justice in Nigeria: Courts, Police, and Politics’ (1981) 11 Issue: 
A Journal of Opinion 29 (‘… British set out in the next century to paint the rest of the world red, and Africa 
offered a particularly tempting expanse of apparently blank canvas. Here courts on the English model 
appeared along the leading edge of colonial intrusion, often as the first institutions to impinge upon the 
local cultures’). On the subject of human rights, see Samuel Moyn, ‘Imperialism, Self-Determination, and 
the Rise of Human Rights’ in Akira Iriye, Petra Goedde and William Hitchcock (eds), The Human Rights 
Revolution: An International History (Oxford University Press, 2012) 162.
26 Twining (n 1) 50.
27 This has been described as the theory of two cultures which comprises the culture of origin of the legal 
system and the culture of the system into which it is transplanted or imposed. See Richard Small, ‘Towards 
a Theory of Contextual Transplants’ (2005) 19 Emory International Law Review 1431.
28 Ronald Olufemi Badru, ‘Rethinking the Colonial Legacy in the Legal Reasoning of the Contemporary 
African State: An Argument from African Metaphysical Epistemology’, http://umconference.um.edu.my/
upload/43-1/papers/016%20BadruRonaldOlufemi.pdf.
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proper place of law in society (especially the major questions of what law, for what society, 
through which sources) is therefore still very much unsettled in those environments.
It has been rightly argued that the failure of imposed law in the post-colony could be 
a result of the theoretical reasoning that undergirded it. An example of this failure could 
be in the area of crime prevention and punishment of which I use the African context 
again for illustration. The claim is that the Western mode of legal reasoning which is still 
dominant in the current African systems of legal justice has been largely ineffective in 
dealing with what is described as ‘metaphysically induced criminalities and other forms 
of covert wrong doing which are now rampant in the modern African society’.29 It was 
therefore recommended that a ‘methodology of African metaphysical epistemology30 be 
adopted to complement the Western mode of legal reasoning in order to enhance truth 
finding … before legal justice is dispensed’.31
Ideas similar to this, as well as the impact of globalisation and the turn to legal 
pluralism, have sharpened the edges of these inquiries, and Twining is very much aware 
of this fact. As such, rather than dissentions over theoretical paradigms in a normatively 
liberal and conceptually unitary legal field, he guides the debate towards the recognition 
of differences and diversity in the range of peoples subject to the law as well as the 
existence of plurality in the normative sources of law. Twining says law is ‘a participant-
oriented discipline largely concerned with the details of immediate, practical, local 
problems’.32 He is keenly aware that ‘globalisation may lead to legal scholarship and 
education becoming detached from its roots in a particular legal tradition and local legal 
practice’ and that this could be a danger.33 Nevertheless, therein also lies the opportunity 
to realise the hopes of global legal diversity or pluralism. He argues that ‘legal practice 
in a multi-cultural society needs to some extent to be multicultural’.34 Though his use 
of ‘legal practice’ in this statement might suggest a narrower, profession-related idea, I 
would see it as incorporating the theory within which the practice is embedded as well. 
4. HARTIAN POSITIVISM AND THE MARGINALISATION OF CUSTOM
An integral part of the colonial project was the delegitimation and marginalisation of 
‘native’ legal systems and processes.35 To justify colonialism and advance its goals, it was 
29 Ibid.
30 An ‘African epistemology’ encompasses, according to the author, four basic ways of knowing: divination, 
revelation, intuition, and reason, each of which could fall into the categories of the supernatural, natural 
and paranormal. Ibid, 13.
31 Ibid, 2.
32 Twining (n 1) 31. 
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Ruth Buchanan, ‘Passing through the Mirror: Dead Man, Legal Pluralism and the De-Territorialization of 
the West’ (2010) 7 Law, Culture and the Humanities 289; see also Rebecca Johnson, ‘Justice and the Colonial 
Collision: Reflections on Stories of Intercultural Encounter in Law, Literature, Sculpture and Film’ (2012) 
9 NoFo 69.
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paramount to first destroy legal theories and knowledge with the potential to support or 
validate native social, legal and political systems and processes. For example, it is a settled 
fact that African societies had been governed under customary law prior to colonisa-
tion.36 However, writing in 1961 at the time when decolonisation efforts were gathering 
momentum in much of the colonised world, Hart posited that ‘[c]ustom is not in the 
modern world a very important “source” of law … It is usually a subordinate one.’37 
Besides Hart’s categorisation of the world’s major legal systems, Steven Vago, writing 
from a plain law and society framework, completely erased customary law as one of 
those systems.38 
The major reason Hart advances as an explanation for custom’s inability to ground 
positive legal norms is that ‘the legislature may by statute deprive a customary rule of 
legal status’. He then mentions the predominant colonial practice of that period by 
which, to be fit for legal recognition, customs were subjected to ‘tests’, including the test of 
reasonableness.39 These tests would require, for example, that to be rendered applicable, 
a rule of customary law shall ‘not be repugnant to justice and morality’ (in Kenya and 
Malawi), not be ‘repugnant to natural justice and morality’ (in Southern Rhodesia), not 
be ‘repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience’ (in Ghana, Nigeria and 
Sierra Leone), or not be repugnant to ‘justice, morality or order’ (in Sudan).40
Hart’s obviously positivist de-coupling of the customary from the range of legitimate 
sources of law relegated custom ‘to the nether world of qualifying adjectives and 
unnatural synonyms: indigenous, imbricated, or informal law, systems of social control, 
reglementation, normative systems, or folkways’.41 However, as argued throughout this 
essay, in a majority of the colonised world, the positivist conception of law and society 
36 Jeanmarie Fenrich, Paolo Galizzi and Tracy Higgins, ‘Introduction’ in Fenrich, Galizzi and Higgins (eds), 
The Future of African Customary Law (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 1. ‘Customary Law’ in this 
context should not be confused with ‘Customary International Law’. As used in this essay, customary law 
has the same meaning as under section 11(3) of the Constitution of Ghana 1992, defined as ‘rules of law 
which by custom are applicable to particular communities in Ghana’, or as in section 291 of the Nigerian 
Evidence Act, Chapter 112 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990, as ‘rule which in a particular district has 
from long usage obtained the force of law’. In Oyewunmi v Ogunsesan (1990) NWLR (Pt 137) 182 at 207 
the Nigerian Supreme Court defined customary law as ‘the organic or living law of the indigenous people 
of Nigeria regulating their lives and transactions’. See also ES Nwauche, ‘The Constitutional Challenge of 
Integration and Interaction of Customary and the Received English Common Law in Nigeria and Ghana’ 
(2010) 25 Tulane European and Civil Law Forum 40.
37 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 1961) 44.
38 Steven Vago, Law and Society (Pearson Prentice Hall, 2006) 12. While not recognised as a ‘legal system’, 
customary law is nonetheless noted as falling into legal ‘tradition’ described as ‘Chthonic’ and marked by 
a distinct character of ‘orality’. See H Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World (Oxford University Press, 
2004) 61. 
39 Hart (n 37) 44.
40 Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism 
(Princeton University Press, 1996) 115.
41 HW Arthurs, Without the Law: Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth Century England 
(University of Toronto Press, 1985) 3.
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could not be realised in actual behaviour because people did not just accept Hartian 
formal laws as the primary basis for regulating their lives.42 
Not surprisingly, ideas like Hart’s are often held accountable for the demise of the 
‘divine, rational, and customary insights that grounded the traditional authority of 
law’,43 whose earlier historical insights were canonised by the likes of Rudolf von Jhering 
when he wrote in opposition to the positive codification of German law. Jhering had 
a simple message: ‘a nation’s law, like its language and other cultural attributes, is an 
unconscious emanation of the volksgeist, the “genius” of its people.’44 There is also a 
sociological dimension to this discourse, exemplified by Eugen Erhlich’s willingness to 
accept as law not just legal provisions meeting Hart’s ‘legal recognition’ attributes but 
all forms of social ordering.45 Yet, as colonialism raged, these non-positivist viewpoints 
were consigned to ‘the long-exploded Law of Nature in which no scientific jurist believes 
anymore’.46 
5. ENDURING CUSTOM IN THE AGE OF GLOBALISATION
The impact of Hartian positivism, notwithstanding African customary law, is not dead 
yet. It has simply not yielded to the hegemony of unitary legal theory. Evidence of its 
durability abounds, for example, in the law and development literature. Moreover, just 
to mention a clear case in point, there is the idea that informality in the property and 
land-holding system is antithetical to economic emancipation through capitalism. The 
existence of plural informal legal orders (or legal pluralism) in such systems is therefore 
equated with anarchy.47 But this theory notwithstanding, informal traditional land-
holding systems continue to regulate such relationships in different parts of Africa. 
42 TW Bennett, ‘Re-Introducing African Customary Law to the South African Legal System’ (2009) 57 
American Journal of Comparative Law 5; Marc Galanter, ‘Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering 
and Indigenous Law’ (1985) 19 Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 17.
43 Berkowitz (n 16) 614.
44 William Seagle, ‘Rudolf Von Jhering: Or Law as a Means to an End’ (1945) 13 University of Chicago Law 
Review 74; see also Pierre Legrand, ‘European Legal Systems are Not Converging’ (1996) 45 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 52; Gunther Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How 
Unifying Law Ends up in New Divergences’ (1998) 61 Modern Law Review 11.
45 Eugen Ehrlich and Nathan Isaacs, ‘The Sociology of Law’ (1922) 36 Harvard Law Review 132; see also 
Stefan Machura, ‘German Sociology of Law: A Case of Part Dependency’ (2012) 8 International Journal of 
Law in Context 506 (stating: ‘Every German law student attending a lecture on the subject will invariably 
hear about Professor Eugen Ehrlich, who lived in the most remote corner of the Austrian Empire, in a city 
that now belongs to Ukraine. There, people of different ethnicity lived, entered contracts and regulated 
claims according to their own customary rules. For them, Austrian codified law, the topic learnt by students 
across the vast empire, was an irrelevant “dead” law. What mattered, according to Ehrlich, was the “living 
law”, the rules people actually use’).
46 Ehrlich and Isaacs (n 45) 131.
47 Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else 
(Basic Books, 2000) 27. See also Celestine Nyamu Musembi, ‘De Soto and Land Relations in Rural Africa: 
Breathing Life into Dead Theories about Property Rights’ (2007) 28 Third World Quarterly 1460.
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Besides, globalisation and Twining’s shade of general jurisprudence are breathing 
new life into that system of social regulation. Along similar lines, it has been argued, 
there might be a big lesson for globalisation as presently understood to learn from 
the literature on law and colonialism.48 Significantly, all over Africa, customary laws 
continue to ‘govern civil and criminal affairs including family relations, traditional 
authority, property rights, and succession’.49 In recent practice, rules of custom and local 
legal processes are beginning to be favoured over and above formal legal institutions 
conceived under liberal notions and positivist thinking in justice delivery mechanisms.50
That customary law remains a strong means of social regulation in Africa and 
elsewhere in the Global South in spite of colonial and postcolonial influences51 confirms 
an all too familiar fact: law is not totally abstract or acontextual. It must be understood 
within a specific social and cultural setting. Theorising law in terms of legal doctrine, 
meaning the ‘rules, principles, concepts … values and the modes of interpreting and 
reasoning’52 of a hegemonic system, departs from this contextual approach. As Twining 
asserts, globalisation and the pluralism that comes with it are challenging ‘standard, 
taken-for-granted assumptions underlying [the] received tradition of academic law’.53 
This challenge is significantly more crucial for subaltern legal systems, their 
scholars and policy makers. It is not in doubt that the dominant legal ideas, systems 
and institutions transplanted through colonialism in the subaltern regions have not 
had the same impact in the postcolonial environments as they did for the regions from 
which they originated.54 There could be a range of reasons for this. For one, it could be 
that the receiving environments had neither equivalent institutional support as in the 
colonising formations nor relevant contextual practices and were therefore ill suited to 
the systems being transplanted. Yet this was apparently ignored in the hope perhaps that 
with time the challenges of socially constructed peculiarities would be overcome. This 
has not quite happened. Instead, mutual tension continues to define the relationship 
48 Martin Chanock, Custom, and Social Order: The Colonial Experience in Malawi and Zambia (Heinemann, 
1998); Sally Engle Merry, ‘From Law and Colonialism to Law and Globalization’ (2003) 28 Law and Social 
Inquiry 570. 
49 Fenrich, Galizzi and Higgins (n 36) 2.
50 See Tanja Chopra, ‘Dispensing Elusive Justice: The Kenyan Judiciary amongst Pastoralist Societies’ (2010) 
2 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 95; Peter Uvin and Charles Mironko, ‘Western and Local Approaches 
to Justice in Rwanda’ (2003) 9 Global Governance 219; Phil Clark, ‘Hybridity, Holism, and “Traditional” 
Justice: The Case of the GACACA Courts in Post-Genocide Rwanda’ (2007) 39 George Washington 
International Law Review 765; Varun Gauri, ‘Customary Law and Economic Outcomes in Indonesia’ (2010) 
2 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 75.
51 Uche Ewelukwa, ‘Posthumous Children, Hegemonic Human Rights, and the Dilemma of Reform: 
Conversations across Cultures’ (2008) 19 Hastings Law Journal 211; TW Bennett, ‘The Compatibility 
of African Customary Law and Human Rights’ (1991) Acta Juridica 18; Fidelis Okafor, ‘From Praxis to 
Theory: A Discourse on the Philosophy of African Law’ (2006) 37 Cambrian Law Review 37.
52 Roger Cotterrell, ‘Community as a Legal Concept? Some Uses of a Law-and-Community Approach in 
Legal Theory’ (2006) 2 NoFo 16.
53 Twining (n 1) 33.
54 See eg Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ‘The Heterogeneous State and Legal Pluralism in Mozambique’ (2006) 
40 Law & Society Review 39.
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between the recipient systems and the traditional forms of social organisation post-
colonisation.55 Globalisation and pluralism, it would seem, enjoin an understanding of 
this phenomenon of tension as a pathway to producing more inclusive legal knowledge 
useful to a diversity of social communities.
It could be argued that transplanted colonial law did not fail in colonised territories 
since it was very useful in creating an environment conducive for the extraction of labour 
and resources. The question could also be asked whether subaltern colonial societies 
actually needed to have equivalent institutional and practical social support for law to 
achieve its purpose. These two concerns are at the heart of Twining’s analysis as well as 
this intervention. We have to note that a globalised understanding of legal knowledge, 
as Twining pursues it, does not just seek to pluralise the idea of law but also welcomes 
new theories alternative to the dominant liberal Euro-American traditions. Why are the 
theories developed by ‘modern European sages’56 considered relevant to ‘other’ societies 
(especially the subaltern) of which these Euro-sages ‘were empirically ignorant?’57 
Twining seems to argue (and Chakrabarty supports) that because of globalisation or 
pluralism it might be time for practitioners of the marginalised legal systems to ‘once 
again return the gaze’.58
But they cannot return the gaze if all they ever do is react to or reproduce the same 
theories developed in Europe and elsewhere in the West. It is therefore useful to recognise 
that while the law under conditions of violence and physical oppression seemed to have 
aided the realisation of colonial goals, this sense of order completely unravelled once 
colonialism ended. Why did this happen even when it was the case that the local elite that 
took over power in the post-colony only increased law’s violence as a tool of oppression? 
The answer to this question could very well lie in the differing understandings of the role 
of law in the colony on the one hand and the post-colony on the other. It has been argued 
that colonial/imperial power provided only the scripts for governance.59 It was more a 
rule by law than of law; not only was it a stranger to the idea of rights but in addition its 
pretension to separation of powers and decentralisation only masked the fact that the 
55 To resolve this tension, the powers of the dominant legal system through colonialism subordinated the 
traditional legal forms to the imposed one. See Virtus Chitoo Igbokwe, ‘The Law of Customary Arbitration 
in Nigeria: Agu v Ikewibe and Applicable Law Issues Revisited’ (1997) 41 Journal of African Law 201; Derek 
Asiedu-Akrofi, ‘Judicial Recognition and Adoption of Customary Law in Nigeria’ (1989) 37 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 571; AN Allott, ‘What is to be Done with African Customary Law? The 
Experience of Problems and Reforms in Anglophone Africa from 1950’ (1984) 28 Journal of African Law 56; 
EI Nwogwugwu, ‘Abolition of Customary Courts: The Nigerian Experiment’ (1976) 20 Journal of African 
Law 1.
56 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincialising Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton 
University Press, 2000) 29.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Upendra Baxi, ‘Postcolonial Legality’ in Henry Shwarz and Sangeeta Ray (eds), Blackwell Companion to 
Postcolonial Studies (Blackwell, 2000) 541.
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centralised nature of colonial state power greatly minimised the possibility of even the 
mildest risk.60 
On the contrary, law had a different justification in the postcolonial subaltern 
state. At least in theory, and unlike during colonialism, law’s justification thereafter 
transcended the mere objective of resource and labour extraction.61 In the postcolonial 
context, it needed to be more development-centred and also connected to the question 
of fundamental rights; none of which was the case in the prior era as earlier argued. Law 
also had to become useful in managing multiple layers of ethnic, religious and other 
frictions arising primarily from the centralised nature of colonial power. How possible 
was it then that these altered objectives of the law could be realised when its rationale 
had changed in the postcolonial setting at the same time that the undergirding legal 
institutions operating this altered understanding remained rooted in the dominant 
colonial ideology? 
To further explain this point, it is particularly important to borrow the parallel 
that is drawn between states where colonialism had been very intense and those states 
where it was less so. While in the former states colonialism led to the transplantation of 
legal ideas and significant displacement of the traditional forms of order and dispute 
resolution,62 in the latter states, some effort was made to retain those local forms of 
order and dispute management. This difference would seem to have impacted the role of 
law in the postcolonial developmental experience. 
By way of illustration, Botswana has been put forward as one such state where the 
‘effect of British colonialism … was minimal, and did not destroy inclusive pre-colonial 
institutions’.63 It is often projected as an African success story and by some accounts 
was the ‘fastest growing country in the world’ from 1965 to 1995.64 This contrasts 
sharply with the experience of other contiguous former British African post-colonies 
like Zambia and Zimbabwe.65 When matched against Botswana, these latter countries 
hardly come up to scratch. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Some scholars have paid attention to how colonialism transformed the developmental trajectories 
of nearly all regions of the world. ‘They divide colonialism into two broad categories – settlement and 
extractive. Settlement colonies were created in areas with relatively benign disease environments yet 
without large indigenous populations. According to these authors, because settlers both demanded and 
helped to construct institutions that protected property rights, settlement colonies had relative effective 
legal systems, institutions that persisted and thereby benefited postcolonial development. Alternatively, 
where large-scale European settlement did not occur, colonial state officials were not constrained by 
European settlers, focused simply on expropriating wealth from the colonised, and therefore failed to 
provide the same legal protection of property as in settler colonies.’ See Matthew Lange, ‘British Colonial 
Legacies and Political Development’ (2004) 32 World Development 905; Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson 
and James Robinson, ‘Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation’ (2001) 
91 American Economic Review 1369. 
62  Moore (n 24) 17.
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Some scholars have argued that the apparent disparity between these countries in 
developmental terms can be explained in part by the intensity of colonial rule and the 
reasoning behind its legal and institutional platform.66 While Botswana was a settler 
colony, the other two were basically extractive. Law was used in a fashion that suited 
specific colonial agendas. While in extractive colonies the objective was principally 
‘to expropriate rents as quickly as possible rather than thinking of the long run’,67 in 
settler colonies, the colonial powers had more long-term goals. This had implications 
for the application of the law as a neo-liberal idea as well as the basic theoretical planks 
supporting it. Sadly, the particular formulation of law, in its extractive incarnation, has 
persisted well beyond colonialism and with mixed, mostly less than positive, results for 
the postcolonial subaltern state.
There is therefore a growing recognition that the Eurocentric conception of legal 
knowledge and theory is open to critique, and this has been noticeable in the legal 
scholarship from subaltern legal traditions.68 In the area of constitutional law, a recently 
published edited volume was devoted to answering the question whether the time had 
come for the development of a constitutional theory of the Global South in general.69 
In Africa, Shivji argues that the continent-wide liberal democracy and the constitutional 
order upon which it is based have become far too fragile and unsustainable.70 Instead, 
he suggests that Africa needs to ‘construct a political and constitutional order rooted 
in alternative forms of state and democracy based on popular livelihoods, popular 
participation and popular power’.71 This argument has also been extended to the 
human rights field. One scholar suggests that in order to promote local capacity for 
improved human rights conditions in Africa, for example, the process ‘must build on 
what actually exists on the ground because attempting to impose norms and models 
66 See Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson, ‘Reversal of Fortune: Geography and 
Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution’ (2002) 117 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 1264 (stating: ‘The historical evidence supports the notion that colonization introduced 
relatively better institutions in previously sparsely settled and less prosperous areas. While in a number of 
colonies such as the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, and Singapore, Europeans 
established institutions of private property, in many others they set up or took over already existing 
extractive institutions in order to directly extract resources, to develop plantation and mining networks, 
or to collect taxes. Notice that what is important for our story is not the “plunder” or the direct extraction 
of resources by the European powers, but the long-run consequences of the institutions that they set up to 
support extraction. The distinguishing feature of these institutions was a high concentration of political 
power in the hands of a few who extracted resources from the rest of the population’). 
67 See Beaulier (n 63) 227.
68 See eg HP Lee, ‘Judiciaries in Crisis: Some Comparative Perspectives’ (2010) 38 Federal Law Review 371; 
Pham Duy Nghia, ‘Confucianism and the Concept of the Law in Vietnam’ in John Gillespie and Pip 
Nicholson (eds), Asian Legal Socialism & Legal Change: The Dynamics of Vietnamese and Chinese Reform 
(ANU E Press and Asia Pacific Press, 2005) 76. 
69 Daniel Bonilla Maldonado (ed), Constitutionalism of the Global South: The Activist Tribunals of India, South 
Africa, and Colombia (Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
70 Issa Shivji, Where is Uhuru: Reflections on the Struggle for Democracy in Africa (Fahamu Books, 2009) 62.
71 Ibid.
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developed elsewhere is both objectionable as a colonial exercise in cultural imperialism, 
and unlikely to be workable in a sustainable manner in practice’.72
6. GLOBALISED LEGAL THEORY AND THE SUBALTERN CHALLENGE
Based on a close reading of the interaction between the dominant Euro-American legal 
tradition and the subaltern systems upon which that tradition was imposed through 
colonialism, two major propositions can be presented. One is that this dominant legal 
academic discourse, according to Twining, ‘has tended to be ignorant, even ethnocentric, 
about other legal traditions and belief systems’.73 Second, it is obviously not in doubt 
that the theories of this dominant tradition (and this is not discounting its merits) have 
not quite served the legal needs of subaltern societies and is literally facing a push-back 
within the context of globalisation, multiculturalism and pluralism.74 In some instances, 
those who practise the traditions of marginalised legal systems are bearding the lion of 
unitary legal production in its den.75 The question that arises then is how this evidence 
can inform legal theory and scholarship in the subaltern regions going forward. Twining 
asserts that as the legal discipline becomes more cosmopolitan, there is a need for schol-
ars from the dominant traditions to ‘become better acquainted with the leading thinkers 
and salient ideas and controversies in other legal traditions and to extend [the] orthodox 
canon of juristic texts’.76
But while this suggestion might be a useful one, it has to be placed in its correct 
context. The marginalisation of non-Western legal ideas is not so much due to the failure 
of the Western legal establishment to recognise those subaltern paradigms. To be sure, 
my critique of this marginalisation is in no way intended to question the usefulness 
of Western ideas of law to the West. Those ideas have served the West to a great extent 
as Western modernity has been built essentially on those theoretical formulations. 
My concern is how and to what extent this essentially Western knowledge could be 
adapted to subaltern settings in such a way that other non-Western notions of law are 
72 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, ‘Expanding Legal Protection of Human Rights in African Contexts’ in 
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im (ed), Human Rights under African Constitutions: Realising the Promise for 
Ourselves (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002) 3; see also Thaddeus Metz, ‘African Conceptions of 
Human Dignity: Vitality and Community as the Ground of Human Rights’ (2012) 13 Human Rights 
Review 19; Makau wa Mutua, ‘The Ideology of Human Rights’ (1996) 36 Virginia Journal of International 
Law 589.
73 Twining (n 1) 45.
74 See Nghia (n 68) 76 where he argues that ‘Legal ideas adopted from the West face difficulties when 
implemented into a society where traditional forces resist change’.
75 See eg Mark Duell, ‘Divorce cases could be settled by Sharia and religious courts after landmark High Court 
ruling over Jewish couple’s dispute’, www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2271682/Divorce-cases-settled-
Sharia-religious-courts-landmark-High-Court-ruling.html. 
76 Twining (n 1) 46.
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strengthened rather than erased. Twining makes a similar point when he asserts that 
as cosmopolitanism pushes the boundaries of law as a discipline, ‘we need to be better 
acquainted with the leading thinkers and salient ideas and controversies in other legal 
traditions and to extend our orthodox canon of juristic texts’.77 This places the ball in 
the court of subaltern thinkers and scholars to show the ‘ideas and controversies’ of their 
legal systems at the theoretical level. 
They seem not to have done so in my view, for two main reasons. The first reason 
is that Southern scholars tend mostly to react to knowledge produced by the dominant 
culture, either because this is the only course open in the circumstances78 or because 
such liberal ideas are ‘impossible to think of anywhere in the world without invoking 
certain categories and concepts, the genealogies of which go deep into the intellectual 
and even theological traditions of Europe’.79 The second reason is that there seems to be 
a mismatch between knowledge produced in the Global South and the actual practices 
of their societies in contrast to the synergy that seems to exist between the two, that is, 
knowledge and practice, in the West. I will discuss these factors in sequence. 
There is some evidence in the literature of a tendency for Southern (subaltern) 
scholars to only react to or apply theoretical knowledge from the dominant tradition. In 
1993, for example, the volume Nigerian Essays in Jurisprudence edited by TO Elias and 
MI Jegede was published. It was intended, as one of the editors stated, to ‘put forward 
… ideas and thoughts on jurisprudence and legal theory as … [a] contribution to the 
current problems in law and action for the world’.80 Two contributions from that volume 
are particularly relevant to the claims I make. First is Elias’s ‘Legal Theory: A Nigerian 
Perspective’81 and, second, Chukwurah’s ‘Reflections on the Crises in Jurisprudence in 
Nigeria’.82 Though introduced as a Nigerian perspective, Elias’s contribution turned out 
to be anything but. Every single idea discussed came from the dominant legal tradition 
of Europe, including Salmond on Jurisprudence,83 Dicey on the rule of law,84 as well 
as Austin85 and Duguit86 on the definition of law. The rest consisted of a sprinkling 
of English and Nigerian cases that supplied little evidence of the advertised ‘Nigerian 
perspective’.
Chukwurah’s contribution followed a similar trajectory even when it was more 
critical of the impact of foreign or received knowledge on the country’s legal identity. 
77 Ibid.
78 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, ‘Law and Development: The Rule of Law in Developing Countries’ (1986) 
Third World Legal Studies 34.
79 See Chakrabarty (n 56) 4.
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However, his entire analysis of this apparent loss of legal identity then rested on the ideas 
of Frederick Charles Von Savigny, the historical school of jurisprudence and in particular 
the concept of the Volksgeist. He asserted that the idea of the Volksgeist ‘is readily 
understandable to any people involved in the political struggle for national rediscovery 
or self-determination, especially after a lengthy spell of foreign colonial tutelage which 
… creates [a] crisis of identity for the legal order of … colonial peoples’.87 
More recently, Idowu sought to interrogate the ways in which the historical and 
cultural heritage of Africa is reproduced, projected and represented in contemporary 
philosophical disquisition.88 He first noted responses to the ‘unrepresentative’ nature 
of the import and substance of African theory of law in general jurisprudence and 
argued that ‘beneath the absence of an Afrocentric approach in mainstream, general 
jurisprudence is the view that mainstream jurisprudence subscribes to a Eurocentric 
historiography defined essentially in skeptical and racial terms’.89 In addition to an 
admirable effort to unearth what this Afrocentric contribution to general jurisprudence 
could be, Idowu’s analysis quickly dissolved into a response to David Hume and Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel on their views of Africans as a people, which, Idowu says, are 
coloured by ‘racial prejudice’.90 Similar to this is the great intellectual ink expended by 
three African scholars on the impact of legal positivism on African legal tradition that 
dwelt on elements of legal positivist theory as understood from the writings of Western 
scholars including Thomas Hobbes, John Austin and HLA Hart.91 
The second factor is that there is an apparent disconnect between ideas generated in 
the South and the social and political practices of these ideas within that environment. 
While it is evident that the socio-political practices of the West enabling their prosperity 
were substantially based on the knowledge produced by their major theorists and 
thinkers,92 the same, it seems, may not be said of the Global South. When not reacting to 
the dominant theoretical ideas,93 subaltern thinkers seem to run on empty because there 
is little linkage (if at all) between their theorising and the actual practices of their social 
and political systems. This is a major challenge. 
87 Ibid, 82.
88 William Idowu, ‘Scepticism, Racism and African Jurisprudence: Questioning the Problematique of 
Relevance’ (2005) 17 Quest: An African Journal of Philosophy 63.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid, 82.
91 See FU Okafor, ‘Legal Positivism and the African Legal Tradition’ (1984) 2 International Philosophical 
Quarterly 157. See also Olufemi Taiwo, ‘Legal Positivism and the African Legal Tradition: A Reply’ (1985) 2 
International Philosophical Quarterly 197; PC Nwakeze, ‘A Critique of Olufemi Taiwo’s Criticism of “Legal 
Positivism and African Legal Tradition”’ (1987) 27 International Philosophical Quarterly 101.
92 See John Cairns, ‘Blackstone, and English Institutist: Legal Literature and the Rise of the Nation State’ 
(1984) 4 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 318; Henry Manne, ‘The Judiciary and Free Markets’ (1997) 21 
Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 21; Karl Klare, ‘Legal Theory and Democratic Reconstruction: 
Reflections on 1989’ (1991) 25 University of British Columbia Law Review 69.
93 See eg Philip Zachernuk, Colonial Subjects: An African Intelligentsia and Atlantic Ideas (University Press of 
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564 Transnational Legal Theory
There is apparently no shortage of authentic and relevant theory and knowledge 
that could serve the developmental needs of the Global South produced by Southern 
scholars.94 It is less clear how many of those ideas actually inform public policy at official 
and unofficial levels in those regions. As such, to earn their stripes, in my view, scholars 
from the Global South would do well to impress their theories on policies that will produce 
prosperity for their regions rather than only react to dominant ideas or seek validation 
from the traditions they criticise. This is at the level of producing useful, fit-for-purpose 
legal knowledge. However, its success is not solely dependent on the practices of the 
scholars. Southern policy makers must also be willing to apply the knowledge produced 
to drive effective public policy. Therefore, there would have to be synergy between the 
knowledge produced and sound practices and results on the ground. 
But as important as it is to generate alternative theoretical paradigms, this will still 
be insufficient unless such knowledge is diffused through education and practice. Such 
knowledge must be sold on its own merits and worth, and not out of concern for its 
source. This makes the task of teaching, sharing and embedding these alternatives in 
the legal and political processes of the Global South equally as crucial. The construction 
and dissemination of legal theory based on alternative knowledge must as such form 
the fulcrum of legal education in the Global South. If the argument is that subaltern 
justice systems would better serve the environments that practise them, this would have 
to be adequately theorised and the utility of those systems exemplified in practical terms. 
This follows Twining’s counsel ‘not [to] abandon our heritage, but rather [to] set our 
scholarship in a global context’.95 If we are talking about customary law, for example, it 
would no longer be sufficient to simply say ‘this is how we lived’. It must be shown how 
its practice advances development and ameliorates human suffering.
7. CONCLUSION
This essay sees possibilities for the pluralisation and globalisation of legal theory from 
the perspective of William Twining’s monograph on Globalisation and Legal Scholar-
ship. As globalisation furthers transnational interaction in ways that were not imaginable 
just a few decades ago, Twining suggests that its impact is pushing the boundaries of 
Western-inspired dominant legal thought towards the recognition of diversity in the 
normative sources of law. I have argued that Twining’s thinking and insights similar to 
his are reviving interest in the legal knowledge systems and institutions of subaltern ter-
ritories upon which the dominant Western notions were imposed through colonialism.
94 See eg Oche Onazi (ed), African Legal Theory and Contemporary Problems: Critical Essays (Springer, 2014); 
see also Godwin Sogolo, Foundations of African Philosophy: A Definitive Analysis of Conceptual Issues in 
African Thought (Ibadan University Press, 1993) 186.
95 Twining (n 1) 57–58.
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I looked at previous attempts to universalise legal theory through the writings of 
major Western legal theorists and thinkers. I noted how they did this in a fashion that 
clearly marginalised and subordinated non-Western understandings and ideas of law. 
Yet, the very concept of law and its socio-political characteristics are still essentially 
contested. This is as much the case in the West as in previously colonised subaltern 
regions of the world. In the latter territories, law’s positivist incarnation has apparently 
not been as effective as in the colonising societies from which its concepts and theory 
were transplanted.
Borrowing from Twining’s insights, I have argued that globalisation and pluralism 
as contemporary ideas are offering an opportunity to marginalised or subaltern legal 
systems to contribute towards the development of a legal theory which accounts for 
a diversity of traditions. But in utilising this opportunity, it has been suggested that 
scholars from the regions where the subaltern traditions are still very much in practice 
must move away from a place of reaction to a place of agency. In constructing theory 
from the standpoint of the subaltern systems, not only would it be required that 
specific theoretical ideas be placed on the table, but they must also be demonstrably fit 
for purpose in practice. It should be clear how the legal knowledge generated in those 
systems informs social and political policy choices as well as advances progress in those 
regions. Finally, such alternative knowledge must also provide the foundation for legal 
education in those regions.
